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Monday, May 24, 2004 - Page updated at 12:00 A.M.
Nuclear report cites lax security, says components too easy to acquire
By Peter Slevin
Then do it, the Delaware Democrat, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, instructed the scientists in a confidential session. A few months later, they returned to the soundproof Senate meeting room with a workable nuclear weapon, missing only the fissile material.
"It was bigger than a breadbox and smaller than a dump truck, but they were able to get it in," Biden said in a recent speech. The scientists "explained how literally off the shelf, without doing anything illegal they actually constructed this device."
The relative ease with which U.S. scientists built a nuclear weapon illustrates the need to secure plutonium and highly enriched uranium scattered in armories and research sites around the world, a pair of Harvard University researchers argue in a new study that contends the Bush administration is not doing enough.
Less fissile material was secured in the two years after Sept. 11, 2001, than in the two years just before, according to the Harvard report, which was obtained by The Washington Post. Half the equipment dispatched to Russia nearly four years ago as a fast, interim solution remains in warehouses, uninstalled because of bureaucratic disputes.
Calling it a "dangerous myth" that terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon only with the help of a rogue state, authors Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier use the Biden example to allege that a failure of U.S. commitment and leadership could lead to a nuclear calamity. They also warn that, in an unstable country, a nuclear weapon could be bought or stolen.
"What's missing is a sense of urgency," said former Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., who heads the nonprofit Nuclear Threat Initiative, which funded the study. Nunn believes President Bush must focus on removing bureaucratic hurdles and work more pointedly with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
"If one of the great cities of the world goes up in smoke, and you look back on these obstacles, it will make our retroactive rearview-mirror look at Sept. 11 look like a waltz," Nunn said yesterday. "It would be so obvious that the obstacles should have been overcome by the presidents."
Bunn and Wier credit the Bush administration, particularly the leadership of the Energy Department, for making strides. But they write that the U.S. commitment is no match for the danger. As they put it, U.S. authorities are not meeting Bush's own pledge to "do all we can."
In one case, plans were announced six years ago to destroy 68 metric tons of plutonium stripped from bombs and warheads in the United States and Russia, but the project remains stalled because of a dispute over who would pay if an accident or sabotage occurred in Russia. Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M., has blamed "trivial negotiating issues."
In another example, the administration on average has requested less money to control nuclear materials and technology than was sought in the final Clinton administration budget, adjusted for inflation. Although 16 percent more money has been spent than if the Clinton numbers had continued, "essentially all" of the increase was injected by congressional initiative, write Bunn and Wier, who reviewed federal spending on nonproliferation as an analyst at the Office of Management and Budget.
"It's very easy in the standard political debate for them to point to the successes and not put them in the context of how small they are, and not showing what they have not yet done," Bunn said. "The president has an opportunity to take action now that would drastically reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism in a few years."
The Bush administration is preparing to announce an expanded effort to secure nuclear stockpiles and supplies of bomb-grade material, officials have said. In a Feb. 11 speech, Bush promised a series of strong steps to curtail the production and spread of fissile material that could be used in a nuclear explosive or scattered in a radiological device called a "dirty bomb."
Basic security improvements have not been made at dozens of facilities in Russia, where more than 60 percent of the country's plutonium and weapons-grade uranium is kept, the General Accounting Office has warned. In a more-recent report, the GAO said U.S. government facilities are also vulnerable to an increased risk of terrorism. Despite improvements in Russia, Bunn and Wier report that visitors continue to see broken detectors, decaying fences, vulnerable seals and paper records never designed for careful monitoring. They also note that fissile material exists in "hundreds of buildings in more than 40 countries."
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